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Abstract 
The bankrupts and financial crisis of large-sized companies, which 
took place in Eastern Asia, USA, Europe and Australia between the middle 
of XX and beginning of the XXI centuries, stimulated to take a deeper look 
into the legal status of the members of the companies’ management bodies, 
because one of the main reasons which determined the bankrupts and 
financial crisis all over the world was bad faith, improper performance of 
duties and negligence of the members of the companies’ management 
bodies. Unfortunately, neither Lithuanian legal acts, nor case law, nor legal 
doctrine provide with clear understanding what is and should be attributed to 
the category of the companies’ management bodies. This implies the 
uncertainty problem regarding the persons to be applied by the liability 
standard of management body members. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to determine the types of companies’ 
management bodies under Lithuanian law. This objective will be reached by 
the analysis of the concept of the management body, presenting the corporate 
governance systems dominating over the world and identifying the content as 
well as the nature of management function performed by the management 
bodies. The research has shown that the management function comprises 
three functions, i.e. direction, representation and control; therefore, board of 
directors, supervisory council and the head of a company are deemed to be 
part of a category of management bodies. 
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Introduction 
The bankrupts and financial crisis of large-sized companies, which 
took place in Eastern Asia, USA, Europe and Australia between the middle 
of XX and beginning of the XXI centuries initiated the reform on the law of 
companies, which was manifested by the amendments of legislature, its 
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improvement, especially in the area of the legal status and liability issues of 
the members of management bodies. At the time, when the world’s economy 
was in the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression in the USA, the 
question of legal status and liability of company’s management bodies 
became one of the most relevant, especially taking into considerations that 
the main reasons of the crisis were named improper governance of 
companies, evaluation and control of risk, implementation and development 
of irresponsible borrowing, the impact of the shareholders to the directors to 
adopt too risky decisions in order to reach bigger incomes by sacrificing long 
term investments, i.e. stimulating the creation of short term value, and other. 
However, valid legal acts regulating specific types of legal persons in 
Lithuania, considering their number and fluctuation, are not harmonised. 
Neither in the legal acts, nor in the legal doctrine there is united opinion 
regarding the definition of the management function; therefore, it is 
unknown, what is and should be attributed to the category of the 
management bodies. This implies the uncertainty problem regarding the 
persons to be applied by the liability standard of management body 
members. Due to this reason the purpose of this study is to determine the 
types of companies’ management bodies under Lithuanian law. This 
objective will be reached by the analysis of the concept of the management 
body, presenting the corporate governance systems dominating over the 
world and identifying the content as well as the nature of management 
function performed by the management bodies. 
The relevance of this study is also proved by the fact, that the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), after 
performance of a detailed research on the financial crisis as of 2008, in 2009-
2010 as one of the main directions to overcome the crisis distinguished the 
necessity of the reform of corporate governance of the companies, by clearly 
defining the legal status of the management bodies, its powers and liability. 
The same was confirmed in the Green Paper “The EU corporate governance 
framework” issued by the European Commission in 2011, stating that “in 
each case, it is indispensable to define clearly the roles and the 
responsibilities of all parties involved in the risk management process: the 
board, the executive management and all operational staff exercising the risk 
function”. Hence, this study is especially relevant both to the national and 
international extent, especially at the moment, when the extent of the 
activities of companies is widen and it includes the territories of few 
countries. 
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System of Corporate Governance 
 Systems of corporate governance5 differ across various countries around 
the world. Even within EU States there has not been developed a single 
system of corporate governance yet. The OECD, when preparing corporate 
governance principles, also emphasized that there was no single system of 
corporate governance throughout the world (OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, 2004). Such regulatory differences depend on historical events, 
distinctions within political and social ideologies (Andenas and Wooldridge, 
2009), as well as other national law branches functioning in the same 
jurisdiction (Antunes et al., 2011). 
It is possible to distinguish the following corporate governance 
systems that can be found in corporate laws of different countries: 1) one-tier 
(unitary) system, characterized by only one management body established 
within a company (for instance, such system of corporate governance is 
implemented in England, Ireland, USA, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Malta and others); 2) two-tier (dual) system, characterized 
by two separate collegial management bodies established within a company, 
one of which is responsible for its day-to-day activities (usually composed of 
executive directors thereof), another – is in charge of implementing 
supervisory role (composed of non-executive directors) (for instance, such 
system of corporate governance is used in Germany, Austria, Holland, 
Poland and others); and 3) mixed system, which covers cases where certain 
state laws, even when granting priority to one system, reserve the choice 
option regarding another system (for instance, such option is recognized in 
Lithuania, Finland, Norway, Italy, Luxemburg and others) (Ernst & Young 
Société d’Avocats, 2009). 
 There is an opportunity to choose and apply either one-tier or two-tier 
systems of corporate governance in a majority of EU countries, but there are 
countries, such as England or Germany, where such option is not provided. If 
according to the laws of the respective countries the supervisory council may 
not be established within a company, the supervision function is usually 
carried out by the shareholders or non-executive directors thereof. But in 
jurisdictions where a mandatory two-tier system of corporate governance is 
determined, there does not exist any possibility to transfer the supervision 
function to any shareholder thereof. However, the requirements of such 
system usually do not correspond to the needs of family companies 6 
                                                          
5  Under the legal doctrine, the companies’ management system is additionally called: 
1) “organizational system of company’s business activities” (Greičius, 2007); 2) “system of 
management bodies” (Abramavičius and Mikelėnas, 1999). However, in this study we will 
use widely known term “system of corporate governance” (Baranauskas et al., 2007). 
6 In most countries throughout the world, family business takes over more than 70% of all 
business activities and makes a significant impact towards the growth of economy or 
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(Abouzaid, 2008) or single investors, who are themselves concerned, being 
shareholders of a company, to execute such supervisory role. This system 
does not also satisfy the interests of corporation group, where the parent 
company is interested in exercising this supervision function itself. Even 
though, it can be taken advantage out of establishment of the European 
Company (SE, fr. Societas Europaea), but this form might be also not 
acceptable due to the large amount of the required authorized share capital. 
 Although different states establish and apply various systems of 
corporate governance, but the role of the board7 therein is usually deemed as 
crucial. For instance, strong boards of directors within companies are 
typically involved into the implementation of company’s business strategy, 
ensuring of proper corporate governance, maximization of benefits available 
for company’s shareholders, as well as protection of legitimate interests of 
any other stakeholders related thereto. However, the boards of directors in 
developing and emerging market economies, including Lithuania, often fall 
into one of the following two categories: 1) so called “rubber stamp” 
boards, which typically play only a minor role in the company’s 
management, thus, convening of their meetings and decision making in their 
nature are more formal procedures, which results that the company is directly 
governed by the controlling shareholder; or 2) so called “family boards”, 
where members usually are relatives of the controlling shareholder which are 
appreciated as long-term reliable advisers, who are able to adopt key 
strategic decisions; such type of a management board can be efficient in 
defending interest of the respective family controlling such company, 
although, in many cases these interests may be contradicting to expectations 
of investors or even long-term goals of a company itself (Robinett, 2003). 
 In order to disclose the concept of companies’ management bodies 
and system of corporate governance functioning in Lithuania, we will further 
analyze the following most common models of the corporate governance 
systems over the world: 1) Anglo-Saxon; 2) Nordic; and 3) German. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
establishment of new working places. For instance, in Spain around 75% of all business 
activities are family business, which makes approx. 75% of its gross national product. As 
successful examples of family business might be specified such widely known companies as 
Salvatore Ferragamo, Benetton and Fiat Group in Italy, LʼOreal, LVMH and Michelin in 
France, Samsung, Hyundai Motor and LG Group in North Korea, BMW and Siemens in 
Germany, Ford Motors Co and Walt-Mart Stores in USA and other (Abouzaid, 2008). 
7 In this case the definition “board” includes the board of directors, the supervisory council 
and the head of a company (author’s note: the latter is a separate management body under 
Lithuanian law). 
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Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and German Models 
Anglo-Saxon Model. In companies of Anglo-Saxon model type, 
members of management body normally act within one single collegial body 
– the board of directors and carry out managing, representation and 
supervisory functions (Davies, 2003). Such board of directors is composed of 
executive and non-executive directors 8 . Non-executive directors perform 
both management function (for instance, provision of advises and directions 
to executive directors regarding the strategy of company’s further 
development and assessment) and also supervisory function (for instance, 
monitoring whether the company’s business activities comply with the legal 
and ethical standards) (Lederer, 2006), and this supervisory function inter 
alia covers supervision of actions of the company’s executive directors 
(Davies, 2003). Furthermore, duties of the board of directors are divided into 
two main groups: decision making and supervision (Forlow, 2009). Decision 
making function determines a duty of directors to adopt decisions that are 
important for the company’s business development, while supervisory 
function – a duty to monitor, how managers of lower level and employees 
implement these decisions and duties foreseen by the respective laws. 
 Nordic Model. In companies of the Nordic model, management body 
members are also acting within a single collegial body – the board of 
directors, which is only in charge of implementing the supervisory function. 
The board of directors is flexible and efficient since only in such case can be 
ensured independence of the board members from the administration officers 
in charge of management and representation functions, including the head of 
a company, who is not considered to be a separate management body. 
 German Model. The corporate governance system in companies of 
German model comprises of two management bodies: supervisory council 
(ger. Aufsichtsrat), performing supervisory and at times representation 
function and board of directors (ger. Vorstand), performing direction and 
representation functions. The board of directors is responsible for execution 
of the company’s day-to-day activities and the supervisory council – for the 
supervision of the board’s actions. Thus, the supervisory council controls the 
board of directors as well as compliance of actions thereof to the statutory 
norms, articles of association of the company and respective business 
strategies that are being implemented (Hopt and Leyens, 2005). Moreover, 
the supervisory council is entitled to act on behalf of the company against the 
board of directors, for instant, when initiating legal proceedings for 
                                                          
8 In UK it is wider used term “non-executive directors”, and in USA – “outside directors”. 
As these are identical definitions based on their content, herein we will use the term “non-
executive directors”. 
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compensation of incurred losses (Art. 112 of the Law on Companies of the 
Federal Republic of Germany). 
 Hence, in companies of Anglo-Saxon model, management body 
members performing direction, representation and supervisory functions act 
within a single collegial management body – the board of directors. In 
companies of Nordic type – at one single collegial management body (the 
board of directors) are functioning members that are only in charge of 
supervisory function. The management structure of German model 
companies comprises the supervisory council performing supervisory and at 
times representation functions and the board of directors performing 
representation functions. 
 
Corporate Governance System in Lithuania: Which Model is Being 
Applied? 
 There is no exact tradition regarding single structure of a company’s 
management in Lithuania, i.e. which model of corporate governance system 
should be chosen – Anglo-Saxon, Nordic or German. 
 Article 2.82(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania (2000) 
(the “Civil Code”) provides that each legal entity shall have sole or collegial 
management body and general meeting of shareholders, unless incorporation 
documents or statutory acts that regulate activities thereof stipulate different 
management structure. Laws establishing separate organizational forms of 
legal entities may determine that management body and general meeting of 
shareholders can be the sole management body of such legal entity, for 
instance, owner and manager of an individual entity can be the same person; 
if a small partnership does not foresee the sole management body, the 
general meeting of small partnership members is also considered as a 
management body thereof (Law on Small Partnership of the Republic of 
Lithuania, 2012). In such case the general meeting is also given respective 
competencies assigned to the management body and each member is 
considered as a member of such management body (Bakanas et al., 2002). In 
reference to stated above, the structure of legal entity’s management body 
can be simple or complex. In Article 18(1) of the Law on Companies of the 
Republic of Lithuania applicable in the year 1990 was provided that the 
general meeting of shareholders is the supreme management body of a 
company. The same provision remained in the wording of this law applicable 
as of the year 1994 and also in the new wording of this law as of the year 
2000. However, as of the year 2004, the general meeting of shareholders is 
not anymore assigned to the management bodies of a company. The Supreme 
Court of Lithuania noted that the general meeting of shareholders is still 
considered to be the supreme body of a company, adopting decisions in 
respect to composition of management bodies, amendment of incorporation 
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documents, liquidation of a company and other matters that are not related to 
company’s daily operational affairs and (or) that are not related to any 
change of entire or significant portion of company’s assets (for instance, 
increase or decrease of a company’s share capital) (Resolution adopted in 
civil case No. 3K-3-329/2009, 2009). However, shareholders are not entitled 
to give directions to management bodies in any way if these management 
bodies are granted certain particular competencies (Bakanas et al., 2002). 
Therefore, such management is also called management by ownership 
(Kiršienė, 2002), resulting in separation of activities of general meeting of 
shareholders from actions of company’s management bodies connected to 
administration of regular business matters thereof. 
 According to the Article 19(1) of the currently applicable Law on 
Companies of the Republic of Lithuania (the “Law on Companies”) each 
company shall have a general meeting of shareholders and a sole 
management body – the head of a company. The Article 19(2) of the Law on 
Companies provides that a company might also have a collegial supervisory 
body – the supervisory council and a collegial management body – the board 
of directors. Thus, in Lithuania there is no statutory obligation to establish 
collegial management body – such as the board of directors, and the head of 
a company will be recognized as a separate management body. As previously 
noted, in either Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and German type companies the head 
of a company is not considered to be a separate management body, since 
such head of a company is usually a member of the board of directors (or it 
can be employee of a company), with whom management or similar 
agreement is concluded regarding assignment to the company’s manager 
position. While in Lithuania the head of a company is a separate 
management body, which in the event the board is not established, is entitled 
to decide on majority of matters that are initially assigned to the competency 
of the board of directors (Article 37(10) of the Law on Companies). 
Otherwise, if no supervisory council is established in the company, functions 
attributed to the competency thereof cannot be assigned or transferred to the 
other bodies of the company (Article 32(2) of the Law on Companies). 
Therefore, the current structure of company’s bodies does not actually 
correspond to either one-tier or two-tier corporate governance systems, since 
the head of a company is distinguished as a separate management body, and 
in such way the board of directors, being a management body, is deprived of 
its exclusive authority to represent the company before the third parties and 
in most cases the board of directors remains only as a supervisory and 
control body but not as an executive body of a company. Accordingly, it 
does not comply with the current case practice, where the board of directors 
has been clearly recognized as a collegial executive management body of the 
company (Resolution adopted in civil case No. 3K-7-124, 2014). 
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Additionally, this does not also comply to the nature of provision stipulated 
in Article 2.82(2) of the Civil Code, where it is stated that each legal entity 
must have the sole or collegial management body, allowing to conclude that 
the legislator did consider sole and collegial management bodies as 
alternatives and, therefore, functions thereof cannot be separated because just 
their respective competences might differ, when company’s incorporation 
documents provides for the establishment of both such bodies. 
Currently there is a draft Law on the Amendment to the Law on 
Companies of the Republic of Lithuania submitted to the consideration of the 
Parliament (Seimas) of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides the 
following proposals: (1) to impose an obligation solely in respect to public 
limited liability companies (not including private limited liability companies) 
regarding a mandatory requirement to form at least one collegial 
management body – board of directors or supervisory council; and (2) to 
entitle the companies, where a supervisory council is not formed, to foresee 
under their articles of association that the board of directors is entitled to 
conduct the following supervisory functions: (i) to supervise the activities of 
the head of a company and submit its comments and proposals in respect 
thereof to the general meeting of shareholders; (ii) to consider whether the 
head of a company is qualified to remain in this post when the company 
continues to incur losses; (iii) to submit its proposals to the head of a 
company regarding revocation of decisions thereof which contradicts to the 
laws and any other applicable legal acts, articles of association of the 
company, the respective decisions of the general meeting of shareholders or 
the board of directors; (iv) to address any other issues assigned within the 
board of directors powers by the articles of association of the company as 
well as by the decisions of the general meeting of shareholders thereof 
regarding the supervision of the company’s and its manager’s actions (Law 
on amendments to Articles 19, 20, 24, 25, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 44, 54, 59, 
601, 63, 67, 69, 72 of the Law on Companies, addition with new Article 452 
and amendment and supplement to the Appendix thereof, 2013). However, 
these proposals still do not solve the aforementioned problem with regard to 
ensuring a possibility for all types of companies to have an option to 
constitute either sole or collegial managing body within its management 
structure. 
 In Lithuania it might be distinguished the following four possible 
alternative corporate governance structures (Kononovič, 2001): 1) four-tier 
(general meeting of shareholders, supervisory council, board of directors and 
head of a company); 2) three-tier with the supervisory council (general 
meeting of shareholders, supervisory council and head of a company); 3) 
three-tier with the board of directors (general meeting of shareholder, board 
of directors and head of a company); and 4) two-tier (general meeting of 
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shareholder and head of a company). Since competencies of a supervisory 
council cannot be assigned to other bodies, then, in theory, Lithuanian 
corporate governance system moves towards the German model with it clear 
separation of functions of direction, representation and supervision. 
However, in practice completely different situation is noticeable, which can 
be seen in Table 1 below, where models of corporate governance system of 
three biggest Lithuanian companies listed on a stock exchange are compared. 
Table 1. Samples of models of corporate governance system within companies listed on a stock exchange 
Name of a company Management bodies and structure thereof Model 
 
Private limited liability 
company Lietuvos 
energija 
 General Manager 
 Board (5 members): 
• 1 executive director (general manager) 
• 4 non-executive directors 
Anglo-Saxon 
Public limited liability 
company 
“GRIGIŠKĖS” 
 Director 
 Board (5 executive directors, including 
director, chief financial officer and others) 
 Supervisory council (5 non-executive 
directors) 
German 
Public limited liability 
company TEO LT 
 General Manager 
 Board (6 non-executive directors, 
performing supervisory and control 
functions) 
Nordic 
 
 In Lithuania the head of a company is not restricted to be appointed 
as a board member. In such case the board is composed of executive and 
non-executive directors (Anglo-Saxon model). When the head of a company 
is not appointed as a board member, the board is usually composed of non-
executive members (Nordic model). In rare cases Lithuanian companies 
selects German model as usually no supervisory council is established 
therein. 
 Hence, it can be summarized that still there has not been developed 
any Lithuanian tradition regarding selection and implementation of single 
corporate governance system within companies. In Lithuania we can find 
companies, applying all three – Anglo-Saxon, German and Nordic – models 
of corporate governance systems. This perception will be significant in 
further parts of this study, when providing possible solutions in respect to 
conceptual issues of the management bodies’ definition. 
 
Types of Management Bodies 
Conceptual Issues Regarding Definition of Management Bodies 
 Neither in appropriate laws of Lithuania, nor in the legal doctrine or 
court practice we may find any united opinion regarding the issue, what can 
be assigned to the category of company’s management body. Accordingly, 
this results in certain conceptual issues, with respect to persons on which 
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shall be applied relevant fiduciary duties or civil liability standard that are 
normally imposed on or undertaken by management body members. 
 After systematic study of regulatory framework, it might be 
distinguished several issues in determination of management bodies’ 
definition. Firstly, there are two terms of different meaning that are used in 
respective legal framework – “management body” and “manager”. In certain 
laws, for instance, the Law on Credit Unions of the Republic of Lithuania 
(1995) (the “Law on Credit Unions”), the Civil Code are found both terms, 
in others – only one of them, such as the Law on Controlling Investment 
Companies of the Republic of Lithuania (2003) (the “Law on Controlling 
Investment Companies”). The Article 21(2) of the Law on Credit Unions 
stipulates that management bodies of the credit union are the board of 
directors and the head of administration, however, in Article 30(1) thereof 
the head of credit union is defined by determining that such category 
includes: 1) members of supervisory council; 2) board members; 3) head of 
administration; 4) head of internal audit council; 5) chairman of loan 
committee; 6) chairman of inspection commission (inspector). It shall be 
noted that according to the Article 2(50) of the Law on Collective Investment 
Institutions of the Republic of Lithuania (2003) managers can not only be 
natural persons (head of depository administration, board of directors and 
supervisory council members) but also legal persons (management and 
investment companies). In such laws, respective definitions of “management 
body” and “manager” are deemed to be in relationship of subordination, i.e. 
term “manager” includes term “management body”. However, under the 
Civil Code these definitions are separated, i.e. by indication that these are 
different terms (for instance, Article 6.67(1), items 2 and 3). The Law on 
Controlling Investment Companies does not contain any management body 
definition and only companies’ managers are determined by defining that 
they are members of supervisory council or board of directors, head of 
administration or deputies thereof, chief accountant (Article 2(8) thereof). 
Such legal regulation does not provide clear answer, what is the legal status 
of company’s managers and how it differs from the legal status of 
management body members, what are responsibilities thereof; and if the 
respective liability standard applicable on management body members shall 
be applied thereupon. In particular, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the 
Republic of Lithuania (2001) (the “Enterprise Bankruptcy Law”) specifies 
term “manager” and namely it stipulates obligation thereupon regarding 
compensation of losses, incurred by creditors due to delay of a company to 
submit application before the court regarding initiation of the bankruptcy 
proceedings (Article 8(4) thereof). Thus, if these uncertainties within legal 
regulations are not removed, even particular credit union employees that are 
considered as credit union’s managers, might incur such liability to 
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compensate respective losses due to default in respect to obligations imposed 
by the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, that indeed is not considered to be 
reasonable and does not correspond to the real regulatory purposes 
associated with such legal provision. 
 Another issue is that the laws too widely define who are deemed to 
be members of a management body. For instance, according to the Article 23 
of the Law on Agriculture Companies of the Republic of Lithuania (1991) 
(the “Law on Agriculture Companies”) the management bodies thereof are 
the board of directors or administration, but it is not provided, which 
persons, excluding the head of administration, are assigned to this category 
of administration officers. There are certain opinions in a law doctrine that 
all persons holding management position within the company shall be 
attributed to a category of management body members (Rimas, 2009). Such 
wide interpretation and regulation of management body members might 
result in difficulties with regard to determination of persons, who shall be 
imposed respective fiduciary duties and civil liability that are normally 
imposed thereupon. 
 Finally, one of key problems remains to be determination of 
supervisory council legal status. In certain laws supervisory council is 
attributed to the category of management bodies, for instance Article 18(1) 
of the Law on Financial Institutions of the Republic of Lithuania (2002) 
anticipates that collegial management bodies of the financial institutions are 
the supervisory council and the board of directors. However, in other laws 
supervisory council is not attributed to the category of management bodies, 
explicitly stating that members of supervisory council, not performing or 
failing to duly perform duties stipulated in the respective legal acts, shall be 
liable in the same manner as members of management bodies, for instance, 
such provisions is set forth in Article 27(5) of the Law on Credit Unions. 
Certain other laws generally do not stipulate any civil liability principles 
applied in respect to supervisory council members, and only stipulate that the 
supervisory council is not attributed to the category of management bodies, 
for instance, such legal regulation is found in the Law on Companies and the 
Law on Cooperative Societies of the Republic of Lithuania (2002). There is 
no unanimous opinion regarding the aforementioned issue neither in legal 
doctrine, nor in court practice or company laws of any foreign states. For 
instance, in Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Cyprus, France 
and Norway supervisory council members are not considered to be members 
of company’s management body (Ernst & Young Société d’Avocats, 2009). 
In laws of Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands (Pereira at al., 2006) is stipulated 
that equal civil liability standards shall be applied to all directors (both, 
executive and non-executive, i.e. members of both, supervisory council and 
boards of directors). In Germany, even if supervisory council is considered 
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as management body, the actual function of a company’s management 
remains in hands of the board of directors, but not supervisory council (Art. 
76(1) of the Law on Companies of the Federal Republic of Germany). The 
supervisory council is entitled to use the veto right on the respective 
transactions, but differently than in USA, England or France, it does not 
have any authority to give direction to the company’s board of directors 
(Kraakman et al., 2009). The German supervisory council can be compared 
to the respective audit and compensation committees established within 
boards of directors of U.S. companies. In common law countries it is 
acknowledged that regardless of differences between roles of executive and 
non-executive directors, duties thereof are considered the same, therefore, 
their liabilities should also not be differentiated (Smerdon, 2004). Although 
under OECD standards, when determining responsibilities of company’s 
management bodies it is stipulated that “<...> Principles are intended to be 
sufficiently general to apply to whatever board structure (authors note: one-
tier or two-tier) is charged with the functions of governing the enterprise and 
monitoring management“ (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
2004), allowing to conclude that a supervisory council is also deemed to be 
included into the category of management bodies. This principle is indirectly 
included into EU legal framework, regulating separate forms of legal entities 
(for instance, EU Council Regulation as of 8 October 2001, No. 2157/2001 
regarding statute of European Company (SE) [2004] OL L 294/1, etc.), 
considering various corporate governance systems of a company that exist in 
different EU member states, but at the same time indicating that one-tier 
board (called administrative body) is equal to two-tiers board (both 
supervisory and management body), that implies that an supervisory body 
should be deemed to be management body, which members should be 
applied same duties and civil liability standard that are imposed on 
management body members. 
 The legal doctrine from the beginning of XX century stated that 
management bodies at all do not exercise any management function, because 
they are solely assigned to perform just supervisory function (Hornstein, 
1950). However, eventually this approach has been criticized by scientists, 
stating that a management body is mainly in charge of management but not 
supervision function (Eisenberg, 2006). Currently, some scientists consider 
that supervisory council shall be attributed to the category of management 
bodies (Kavalnė and Norkus, 2011) as management bodies inter alia 
exercise supervisory function (Douglas, 1934). Other scientists on the 
contrary remain to the opinion that supervisory council is not and cannot be 
deemed to be a management body, because it does not exercise any 
management function (Rimas, 2009). R. Greičius can also be attributed to the 
latter group of authors, but according to this author, members of supervisory 
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council, same as members of management body, have fiduciary duties set 
forth in Article 2.87 of the Civil Code, that allows to come to conclusion that 
they can also be imposed civil liability standard applicable to management 
body members (Greičius, 2007). However, legal doctrine also contains 
opposite views – A. Bosaitė and S. Butov states that members of supervisory 
council are not and cannot be assigned duties foreseen in Article 2.87 of the 
Civil Code as such body does not perform any management functions 
(Bosaitė and Butov, 2009). 
 The Supreme Court of Lithuania stays at the opinion that 
supervisory council is a management body (Resolution adopted in civil case 
No. 3K-3-19/2012, 2012), thus, liability of members thereof shall be 
determined upon applying analogical provisions, anticipating civil liability as 
regards to the board members (Resolution adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-
214/2011, 2011). The Court has identified the board of directors as an 
executive management body in charge of company’s management, 
implementation of company’s goals, proper commercial business activities, 
as well as company’s management practice and supervision thereof, while 
the supervisory council has been identified as an supervisory management 
body, in charge of controlling board of directors activities, company’s 
financial status, use of funds, accounting as well as compliance of other 
company’s documents to the legal requirements (Resolution adopted in civil 
case No. 3K-7-226/2006, 2006). However, the Supreme Court did not 
provide any detailed reasoning, justifying such perception. The Supreme 
Court only emphasized, that the supervisory council was also a management 
body, regardless of its differences in status, particularities of actions, as well 
as mandate and competencies thereof (Resolution adopted in civil case No. 
3K-3-139/2009, 2009). It should be noted that the Supreme Court practice 
does not state that a supervisory council does not exercise management 
function. Moreover, attention is mainly drawn towards existing differences 
in mandates and competencies of supervisory council and board of directors. 
As will be further identified in this study, terms “function” and “competence” 
in terms of content remain to be considered different terms. Therefore, 
respective misunderstandings regarding management body performed 
functions imply that aforementioned issues in respect to management body 
definition appear. 
 
Functions and Competence of Management Bodies 
 As of XX century, management function was recognized as a 
separate function, not connected to any risk capital contributions into the 
company (Davies, 2002). Management function remains solely assigned to 
the discretion of management bodies. However, the scope of such function 
depends on the size of a company, allocation of shares, as well it may vary 
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based on implementation of regulations of an ordinary dominant shareholder 
or supervision of senior employees responsible for fulfilment certain 
managerial tasks in the company, remaining actually in charge of adopting 
and implementing strategic goals (Davies, 2002). It is quite common that in 
public type companies the management function is being carried out by the 
board of directors and (or) the head of a company, while in closed type 
companies – to the shareholders, who are either directors de jure or de facto 
assigned these duties, when formally thereof should be carried out by another 
body (Tikniūtė, 2006). J. Kiršienė and A. Tikniūtė state that in order for one 
or another body within a company to be deemed as a management body, it 
shall be granted certain controlling powers or any key portion thereof 
(Kiršienė and Tikniūtė, 2004). In the event no controlling powers are 
delegated thereto, then shareholders are in charge of implementing such 
management function, for instance in one-member companies, where 
shareholders de facto are also normally holding position of a manager, 
establishment of any other management bodies are pointless, because 
company’s interests and intentions fully meet interests of its shareholders 
(Kiršienė, 2003). However, even when in public type companies the general 
meeting of shareholders carries out management function, in terms of scope 
thereof it is completely different from actual management functions 
exercised by management bodies. In Supreme Court practice, management 
of shareholders is referred as a strategic management, being understood as 
finding solutions regarding any crucial, extraordinary long-term business 
strategy related matters (Resolution adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-
168/2009, 2009). 
 In Lithuanian legal system terms “function” and “competency” are 
quite frequently confused, as there is no clear distinction in between these 
terms, although in substance they are very different. The Supreme Court of 
Lithuania indicates that “key functions of a company’s manager are 
organization of company’s day-to-day activities, hiring and dismissing of 
employees, conclusions and termination of employment contracts, as well as 
promotion of employees or initiating disciplinary actions in respect thereto” 
(Resolution adopted in civil case No. 3K-7-444/2009), however, these 
activities shall be understood as a capacity of a company’s manager 
itemizing its performance of functions having managerial nature. However, 
in other resolution the Supreme Court of Lithuania states that “when 
comparing competences of the board of directors and the head of a company 
as assigned under the Law on Companies of the Republic of Lithuania, it is 
noticeable, that the duties of the board of directors are basically related to the 
control of the company’s manager’s actions, execution of certain managerial 
functions having more general nature and rather passive participation within 
the day-to-day activities of the company, for which the responsibility lies 
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with the company’s manager” (Resolution adopted in civil case No. 3K-7-
124, 2014). The Civil Code distinguishes but does not determine the 
respective definitions (for instance, Article 2.82(1) thereof). However, in a 
legal doctrine these functions of company’s bodies are determined as 
follows: 1) developing and representing intentions (will) of a company; 2) 
managing legal company’s activities; 3) acting on behalf of a company 
without being granted separate authorizations (Baranauskas et al., 2007). As 
it was previously noted, the first function is assigned to the general meeting 
of shareholders. This means that the other two functions – management and 
representation are assigned to the management bodies. 
 In dictionary of international words, term “function” (in Latin functio 
– performance, action) is determined as “duty, mandate, scope of actions”, 
while “competency” (in Latin competentia – dependency (at law)) – as 
entirety of rights and obligations of certain institutional body or agency, set 
by the statute or internal regulations thereof (Vaitkevičiūtė, 1999). 
 In terms of this study it is important to define functions of directors 
as management body members and the respective competencies thereof. In 
dictionary of international words, term “director” is determined as a person, 
to whom shareholders entrusted the entire control and direction of a 
company (Gove, 1993). In legal dictionary, term “director” is defined as a 
person, who is assigned or appointed to the board of directors, which 
manages company’s affairs by exercising control over lower level officers 
(Garner, 1999). Therefore, directors are assigned the direction and control 
functions. Hence, upon summarizing views under a legal doctrine and 
defining respective terms, we can state that management bodies are assigned 
the following functions: 1) direction; 2) representation; and 3) control. Such 
functions are understood as comprising scope and content of entire 
management function. 
 This perception is based not only under EU regulations, but also 
under the legal doctrine and provisions found in the company laws of foreign 
states. For instance, Article 2(1) of the EU Parliament and Council Directive 
as of 16 September 2009 No. 2009/101/EB regarding coordination of 
security measures, which are imposed by EU Member States against 
companies, specified in Article 48(2) of the Agreement, seeking to protect 
their own or third party’s legitimate interests, aiming to unify application 
thereof [2009] OL L 258/11, provides a clear distinction between direction 
(administration), representation and control functions, assigning them to 
respective members of management bodies, based on applicable corporate 
governance system. In German company law it is clearly defined two 
functions exercised by board members: direction (ger. Geschäftsführung) 
and representation (ger. Vertretung). Direction function has an internal 
character and it is related to respective rights and obligations used for 
European Scientific Journal   June 2014 edition vol.10, No.16   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
58 
company’s management, while representation function has an external 
character and it is related with rights and obligations during representation of 
the company before the third parties (Dornseifer et. al., 2005). The 
supervisory council performs supervision of board actions (Art. 111(1) of the 
Law on Companies of the Federal Republic of Germany) and, therefore, it 
cannot implement functions assigned to the board of directors. The same 
approach is found in Italian company law (Dornseifer et. al., 2005). Hence, 
management function is exercised by both, board of directors and 
supervisory council, but such bodies carry out management functions 
different in their nature – direction, representation and (or) control functions. 
 Direction function is usually assigned to the board of directors and 
the head of a company, for instance, Article 23 of the Law on Agriculture 
Companies anticipates that the board of directors is in charge of managing of 
the company’s activities (Article 24(1) thereof). The scope of such function 
might be defined by reference to the mandate of organization of company’s 
day-to-day activities. Under opinion of R. Greičius, a key function of head of 
a company’s is such organization of company’s regular daily activities, while 
functions of the board of directors are connected to respective organizational 
issues of company’s daily affairs management (Greičius, 2007). The same 
position is found in court practice, specifying that management of daily 
business activities is inter alia assigned to management bodies of a company 
(Resolution adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-19/2012, 2012). 
 Representation function under legal entity doctrine is understood as 
an external function (Bakanas et al., 2002), where actions of respective 
company’s body are equivalent to actions of a company itself (Baranauskas 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, management bodies of a company are entitled to 
exercise such representation function ex officio, i.e. without obtaining any 
additional authorizations. Such representation cannot be compared to 
standard legal representation relations, stipulated under Article 2.132-2.185 
of the Civil Code. In general, such function is related to management body 
actions on behalf of a company in its relations with the third persons. Such 
right under Lithuanian legal system is exclusively assigned to the sole 
management body of a company – head of a company (Article 37(10) of the 
Law on Companies), unless the incorporation documents thereof stipulates 
the rule of quantitative representation. But this contradicts to equality 
principle in respect to management bodies as anticipated in Article 2.86 of 
the Civil Code, under which the right to represent a company in its relations 
with the third persons, shall be equally granted to all management body 
members thereof (Bakanas et al., 2002). We do believe that such rights shall 
be granted to those members of management bodies, who inter alia exercise 
company’s direction function, such as the head of the company or the board 
of directors. In such a manner the equality principle would be respected in a 
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functional level, at the same time ensuring the efficiency and productivity of 
the board of directors, as currently board of directors in Lithuania are 
established and acting only on a formal basis, mainly exercising just 
supervision function. Thus, such principle of representation would become 
more acceptable and understandable to the foreign investors and would not 
result in concentration of representation powers in hands of single person, 
i.e. the head of a company. 
 The scope of control function is as well not homogenous. Such 
function might be understood as a control of company’s developments and 
assumed risks exercised by the general meeting of shareholders (for instance, 
by appointing members of management bodies, sale of shares, supervising 
implementation of higher risk business strategies) (Blair and Stout, 1999). In 
particular currently, when it is noticeable a tendency of increase in market 
share held by institutional investors, that is considered to be a normal 
outcome of extension and modernization of financial markets, the control 
level exercised by shareholders-institutional investors is also growing, as 
individual shareholders usually are subscribing shares seeking to receive 
dividends, while institutional investors – aiming to exercise control over a 
legal entity (Bainbridge, 2010). In legal doctrine three main control areas 
exercised by shareholders are being distinguished: (i) control of a content of 
company’s incorporation documents; (ii) control of company’s management; 
and (iii) control of company’s additional economical value (Davies, 2002). 
This issue of company’s management gains higher importance in companies, 
where management is centralized, i.e. in companies, where shareholders 
assigned management functions to management bodies, instead of keeping it 
in their hands. Control of company’s shareholders might be exercised in two 
ways: (i) by appointing and dismissing members of management bodies or 
by determining order of their decision making; for instance, by obligating the 
head of a company to obtain prior approval of shareholders in respect to 
implemented transaction. Another control forms are the control of 
company’s activities exercised by the supervisory council (Article 31(1) of 
the Law on Companies) or control of actions of a company’s manager as is 
exercised by the board of directors or control of company’s day-to-day 
activities as is exercised by the head of a company (Summers, 1991), etc. 
However, all these controlling options are considered to be different as some 
of them are attributed to managerial function but others – are not. For 
instance, the general meeting of shareholders is not entitled to exercise 
functions attributed to management bodies, including control function 
(Article 20(2) of the Law on Companies), as this body is only in charge of 
controlling company’s management. Furthermore, control function assigned 
to supervisory council cannot be assigned to any other bodies of a company 
(Article 19(3) of the Law on Companies). 
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 Management functions, i.e. components and content thereof are 
specified under the competencies attributed to company’s bodies, which in 
legal doctrine are most frequently determined as an entirety of all rights and 
obligations, stipulated under the laws and incorporation documents of a 
company (Abramavičius and Mikelėnas, 1999), or as the essential 
requirements for the respective entity regarding performance of or refraining 
from certain actions (Greičius, 2007). The competencies of company’s 
bodies are determined not only in the Civil Code (for instance, Article 
2.82(3) thereof), or respective laws (for instance, Article 20 of the Law on 
Companies stipulates competencies of the general meeting of shareholders, 
Article 32 thereof – the supervisory board, Article 34 – the board of 
directors, and Article 37 – the head of a company), but also might be defined 
in respective provisions of incorporation documents. Competencies play a 
significant role as based thereupon it is possible to determine a scope of 
functions exercised by company’s bodies, such as scope of control or 
direction functions. 
 Considering the foregoing study, it is possible to conclude that the 
management function comprises three functions distinguishing in terms of 
their content – i.e. direction, representation and control. In reference to the 
aforementioned perception, the following company’s bodies are deemed to 
be part of a category of management bodies: collegial management bodies, 
i.e. executive and supervisory body (board of directors and supervisory 
council), and also a sole management body, i.e. the head of a company. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis herein has shown that still there has not been developed 
any Lithuanian tradition regarding selection and implementation of single 
corporate governance system within companies. In Lithuania we can find 
companies, applying all three – Anglo-Saxon, German and Nordic – models 
of corporate governance systems. 
 The authors also note that the management bodies are assigned the 
following functions: 1) direction; 2) representation; and 3) control. Such 
functions are understood as comprising scope and content of entire 
management function. 
 Accordingly, the authors make a conclusion that the following 
company’s bodies are deemed to be part of a category of management bodies 
in Lithuania: 1) collegial management bodies, i.e. board of directors and 
supervisory council; and 2) sole management body, i.e. the head of a 
company. 
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